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EXPLORING FINANCIAL ABUSE AS A FEATURE OF FAMILY LIFE: AN ANALYSIS OF COURT OF 
PROTECTION CASES  
 
 
The financial abuse of older people, especially of those lacking capacity, can take many forms 
– committed by strangers, in person, on the doorstep, on-line or by telephone (especially 
scams of various sorts), or by family, friends or acquaintances.  Of all these, financial abuse 
within the family is perhaps the most morally charged – and the most difficult to identify. The 
case analysis reported here, focusing on intra-family financial abuse –  is part of a broader piece 
of research looking at the financial abuse of adults lacking capacity, of all ages, and the ways in 
which different agencies and institutions – local councils, the Courts, police and charities – 
respond to the challenge to prevent, identify or deal with it.1  The project as a whole used a 
mix of qualitative and quantitative methods in its investigation involving scrutiny of national 
and local statistics, interviews with professional experts and a focused study of one local area. 
The data presented here show how analysis of cases heard in the Court of Protection2 can 
enhance understanding of one type of financial abuse. The aim was to explore a research 
proposition that suggested that difficult intra-family relationships may be a significant source 
of risk to vulnerable people who are dependent on family members for support and protection.   
 
Court of Protection (CoP) cases 
 
One of the functions of the Court of Protection (CoP), in England & Wales, is dealing with 
applications relating to attorneyships and deputyships acting for donors lacking capacity. There 
has been a significant increase in the numbers of Lasting Powers of Attorney (LPAs) registered 
by the Office of the Public Guardian in recent years (e.g. a 34% increase from 295,000 in 
2013/14 to 395,000 in 2014/153) and a parallel increase in the numbers of applications to the 
CoP for the revocation of some of them, the appointment of new deputies to replace them or 
other remedial action.  In recent years, Senior Judge Lush has reported a steady increase over 
several years4. In particular, he dealt with 313 safeguarding applications from the Public 
Guardian (PG) in 2014 as compared to 185 in 2013. 
 
Case sample 
 
From the 63 cases heard in the Court of Protection during the period 1 January – 9 November 
2015 and posted on the BAILII website5, we selected 34, 32 heard by Senior Judge Lush,  which 
appeared to deal with matters relating to the exercise of power of attorney, both proper and 
improper, in matters to do with property and financial affairs. We rejected 27 cases as not 
relevant (14 because they dealt with deprivation of liberty orders and 13 dealing with medical 
treatment issues). Two were inadvertently overlooked.  
                                                          
1 The research was funded by the Dawes Trust. 
2 A superior court of record established under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 with a statutory jurisdiction for making a range 
of decisions on behalf of people who lack capacity, sitting in England and Wales. 
3 Office of the Public Guardian Annual Report & Accounts 2014-15  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/officeof-
the-public-guardian-annual-report-and-accounts-2014-to-2015  
4 Lush, D (2014) Financial crimes committed against the elderly and infirm: a review of its increasing prevalence and how 
effective practitioners, public bodies and the Courts are at tackling it, delivered to a STEP [Society of Trust and Estate 
Practitioners] seminar, London. 
5  www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCOP/ 
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Case characteristics 
 
The 34 subjects of the cases (donors) were predominantly female (74%). Most were elderly, 
i.e. 70+ years, (79%) and, of the remaining seven, three were under 30 and another four 
between 30 and 69.  Most had dementia (25) with a small number having mental health 
conditions (2), acquired brain injury, including one who also had dementia (4) or learning 
disabilities (1).  In two cases, the donors was found not to lack capacity. Twenty-one of the 
donors were living in care homes, while 12 were living either in their own home or with their 
family. 
 
Most cases were applications for the appointment, reconsideration, affirmation or revocation 
of attorneyships or deputyships. A majority (Table 1) were brought by the Public Guardian (PG), 
usually after investigation by the OPG into the way in which a power of attorney had been 
exercised. In most other cases, family members were the applicants, often in challenges to 
other family members as a result of their dissatisfaction with current or proposed 
arrangements in which the other relative(s) were thought to be (or would be in the future) 
taking material advantage of their position as attorneys (in ways that either clearly damaged 
the interests of the donor – or, more veiled, furthered their own personal interests). 
 
Table 1   Number of cases x applicant category  
Applicant -n % 
Public Guardian (PG) 18 53 
Donor    1  3 
Family (incl two cases 
+ donor) 
13 38 
Council   2  6 
Total cases 34 100 
 
In terms of those responding to applications (Table 2Ϳ ŵost ǁeƌe ŵeŵďeƌs of doŶoƌs͛ faŵilies 
(26 solely family members and 3 family members with others):  
Table 2  Number of cases x respondent category 
Respondent -n % 
PG  1 3 
Donor  1 3 
Donor + CICA (Criminal  Injuries  
Compensation  Authority) 
 1 3 
Family 26 76 
Family + donor  1 3 
Family + lawyer  1 3 
Council + family   2 6 
Deputy  1 3 
Total 34 100 
 
According to our own assessment of case accounts, 18 of the 34 cases showed signs of possible 
financial misbehaviour. Table 3 shows the distribution – with most cases (13) being those 
where the PG was the applicant: 
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Table 3  Cases where potential financial abuse (FA) was identified or claimed x applicant category 
Applicant Cases 
PG 13 
Family 4 
Council 1 
Total 18 
 
Intra-family disputes often characterised cases brought by families themselves (9), but many 
of the cases where the PG was the applicant (13) also displayed similar behaviour (Table 4): 
 
Table 4  Cases characterised by intra-family disputes or disagreements x applicant category 
Applicant Cases 
PG 13 
Family 9 
Council 1 
Total 23 
 
In 14 cases overall, there were indications of both financial misbehaviour and intra-family 
disputes co-occurring. 
 
Case details: the range of misbehaviour 
 
Of the 34 cases, our analysis indicated that 18 involved financial misbehaviour by attorneys or 
deputies which constituted, in the opinion of the Senior Judge, a breach of their fiduciary duty, 
the contravention of their authority and/or a failure to act in the donor͛s ďest iŶteƌests. As we 
shall see, this misbehaviour seemed in a number of cases to indicate financial abuse, involving 
apparently intentional fraud or misappropriation of funds.  
 
Complicity between attorneys was sometimes involved, with a co-attorney remaining wilfully 
or lazily ignorant of the actions of the other(s) and shuffling off responsibility for becoming 
iŶǀolǀed iŶ ŵaŶagiŶg the doŶoƌ͛s affaiƌs. IŶ otheƌ Đases, aŶ attoƌŶeǇ alone might have acted 
badly, without reference to co-attorneys either jointly or severally responsible. Misuse of a 
doŶoƌ͛s fuŶds did Ŷot necessarily imply fraudulent intent; instead it might be grounded in naïve 
incompetence, bitter intra-family disputes or the pressure of personal problems.  
 
Case reports often included statements by respondents expressed in tones ranging from 
contrition, faux surprise, apparent amazement, brazen self-justification to argumentative 
ĐoŶtestatioŶ of the judge͛s ǀieǁ. One ƌespoŶdeŶt͛s self-serving justifications, for example, 
included: the shock and legal costs of a drink driving charge and the need for money for his 
soŶ͛s uŶiǀeƌsitǇ fees and air flights. Senior Judge Lush however, found something rather 
diffeƌeŶt: the ŵaŶ͛s puƌĐhase of pƌopeƌtǇ foƌ hiŵself out of his ŵotheƌ͛s fuŶds aŶd the 
pocketing of the rental income (c 55). 
 
In other cases, the key players were apparently contrite and apologetic for their behaviour: 
͞I apologise foƌ this ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ afteƌ the heaƌiŶg. I ǁas a ďit out of ŵǇ depth …..I 
would also like to apologise for the invoice sent to the OPG. It was a hot-headed 
atteŵpt ďoƌŶ out of fƌustƌatioŶ …… ThaŶk Ǉou agaiŶ foƌ Ǉouƌ tiŵe aŶd uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg 
duƌiŶg the heaƌiŶg. I ǁill Ŷot tƌouďle Ǉou agaiŶ,͟ paƌa Ϯ8, c 21. 
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Overall, we identified the following range of financial misbehaviour:   failure to provide accounts to the Court or OPG;   arrears in the payment of care home fees;   failure to provide the donor, resident in a care home, with a weekly personal allowance;    lack of sepaƌatioŶ of the attoƌŶeǇ aŶd doŶoƌ͛s fuŶds ;Đo-mingling);  speŶdiŶg oŶ puƌĐhase of oƌ ƌepaiƌs to pƌopeƌtǇ Ŷot the doŶoƌ͛s;   holdiŶg doŶoƌ͛s ŵoŶeǇ iŶ aŶ aĐĐouŶt iŶ oǁŶ Ŷaŵe;  gifting to self and own family above permissible levels without CoP approval;   uŶjustified aŶd false Đlaiŵs as to ǁhǇ doŶoƌ͛s ŵoŶeǇ had ďeeŶ speŶt;  chaotic incompetence in managing the property and financial affairs of the person 
lacking capacity. 
 
Analysis suggests that this range falls into two broad categories:  behaviour that points to possibly abusive behaviour and therefore should be classified 
as alerts (triggers) of suspicion; and   behaviour which in itself appears to be abusive.  
 
Thus, the existence of care home arrears, as Senior Judge Lush remarked several times, relates 
to the former, ǁhile eǀideŶĐe of giftiŶg ďǇ the attoƌŶeǇ of laƌge aŵouŶts of a doŶoƌ͛s ŵoŶeǇ 
to self or relatives is a case of the latter. 
 
Types of suspicion triggers 
 
Failure to keep and provide accounts  
  
The Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice6, (para 7.67, in relation to attorneys; para 8.56, in 
relation to deputies) states that aĐĐouŶts of tƌaŶsaĐtioŶs ŵade oŶ the doŶoƌ͛s ďehalf ŵust ďe 
kept and provided to the CoP on request. 
 
In at least 12 cases, the Senior Judge noted that failure to keep or provide accounts had been 
at issue. For example:  
 
͞Theiƌ failuƌe to keep aĐĐouŶts of the tƌaŶsaĐtioŶs Đaƌƌied out oŶ the doŶoƌ͛s ďehalf oƌ 
to produce any record of her income and expenditure would alone be sufficient to 
warrant the revocation of their appointment. However in this case both attorneys, and 
in particular DA, have compounded their culpability by taking colossal advantage of 
their position and obtaining personal benefits far in excess of the limited power that 
attoƌŶeǇs haǀe to ŵake gifts of the doŶoƌ͛s pƌopeƌtǇ….  DA has also failed to keep the 
doŶoƌ͛s ŵoŶeǇ aŶd pƌopeƌtǇ iŶteƌest sepaƌate fƌoŵ heƌ oǁŶ iŶteƌests͟ paƌa ϯϰ, Đ ϰϭ.  
 
Sometimes, ineptitude, affection and mismanagement all went hand in hand. In a case 
reconsidering revocation, where the attorney had failed in his fiduciary duty by co-mingling 
                                                          
6 Mental Capacity Act 2005, Code of Practice, Issued by the Lord Chancellor on 23 April 2007 in accordance with sections 42 
and 43 of the Act. 
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funds, failed to keep and provide accounts, and allowed care home fees to fall into arrears, he 
claimed: 
 
͞I aŵ a kiŶd aŶd ĐaƌiŶg peƌsoŶ aŶd of good ĐhaƌaĐteƌ ǁho has devoted as much time 
as possible to a man who deserved to be looked after by his family in the best possible 
ǁaǇ…..I still haǀe his ďest iŶteƌests at heaƌt aŶd ǀisit hiŵ as ofteŶ as I ĐaŶ usuallǇ oŶĐe 
a ǁeek aŶd ŵake suƌe he has eǀeƌǇthiŶg he Ŷeeds,͟ paƌa 23, c 2. 
 
The Senior Judge however, in confirming the revocation, concluded: 
 
͞He ŵaǇ ďe aŶ affeĐtioŶate aŶd atteŶtiǀe stepsoŶ ďut that͛s Ŷot the poiŶt. He has ďeeŶ 
a hopeless attorney and has broken almost every rule in the book and I sense that he 
has doŶe so ǁilfullǇ,͟ paƌa ϯϲ, Đ Ϯ. 
 
Failure to fulfil aŶ attoƌŶeǇ͛s ƌespoŶsiďilities ďeĐause of peƌsoŶal pƌessuƌes is ƌaƌelǇ aĐĐepted 
as an excuse: 
 
͞I appƌeĐiate that BW is ŵaƌƌied ǁith fiǀe ĐhildƌeŶ, tǁo of ǁhoŵ haǀe speĐial Ŷeeds; 
that he ǁoƌks full tiŵe as a Điǀil seƌǀaŶt; that the tiŵe he has to deal ǁith his fatheƌ͛s 
affairs is very much limited and that he is currently stressed, but these are reasons for 
disclaiming the attorneyship rather than persisting in performing it iŶadeƋuatelǇ,͟ paƌa 
28, c 9. 
 
Care home arrears and failure to provide a personal allowance 
 
We found 10 cases of care home fees in arrears (out of the 21 cases where the donor was 
resident in a care home, Table 4). They were often linked with the withholding of a personal 
allowance from the resident by the attorney or deputy, an abuse in itself in terms of financial 
and personal neglect.  Senior Judge Lush frequently drew attention to the association between 
these failures and other misbehaviour: 
 
 ͞As I haǀe said elseǁheƌe ͞ǁith alŵost uŶeƌƌiŶg ŵoŶotoŶǇ iŶ Đases of this kiŶd, a 
failure to pay care fees and a failure to provide a personal allowance are symptomatic 
of ŵoƌe seƌious iƌƌegulaƌities iŶ the ŵaŶageŵeŶt of aŶ oldeƌ peƌsoŶ͛s fiŶaŶĐes,͟ ͟ paƌa 
28, c 19. 
 
 ͞As is fƌeƋueŶtlǇ oďseƌǀed iŶ Đases of this kiŶd, failuƌe to paǇ Đaƌe hoŵe fees, a failuƌe 
to provide an adequate personal allowance, a failure to visit, and a failure to produce 
financial information to the statutory authorities, go hand in hand with the actual 
ŵisappƌopƌiatioŶ of fuŶds,͟ paƌa ϯϴ, Đ ϱϱ.   
 
Senior Judge Lush also remarked that using the excuse (as seems to be common) that the 
attorney is waiting for the outcome of a decision on NHS Continuing Care eligibility is no excuse 
for withholding payment of fees:  
 
͞While atteŵpts to ƌesolǀe the dispute aƌe takiŶg plaĐe, the attoƌŶeǇ should ĐoŶtiŶue 
to paǇ the doŶoƌ͛s Đaƌe fees. If it tƌaŶspiƌes that the doŶoƌ Ƌualifies foƌ NH“ CoŶtiŶuiŶg 
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Care and has been eligible for some time, the NHS will refund any overpayment of care 
fees,͟ paƌa ϯϲ, Đ ϱϱ.   
 
Of the 10 cases where care home fees were in arrears, 8 seemed to show evidence of some 
financial misbehaviour amounting to abuse. For example, in c 68, where there were care home 
arrears of £2ϵ,ϬϬϬ, the doŶoƌ͛s soŶ, heƌ attoƌŶeǇ, had Đhaƌged his ŵotheƌ a dailǇ ƌate of £ϰϬϬ 
for visiting her and, according to the OPG investigation officer, had also paid himself over 
£49,000 from her funds, claiming it was for time he had spent pursuing a claim against the local 
health board in Wales on her behalf. Further, in his witness statement and contesting the need 
to replace him as attorney by a panel deputy, he said:  
 
͞I aŵ the sole heiƌ aŶd ďeĐause of ŵǇ ŵotheƌ͛s deŵeŶtia aŶd ĐuƌƌeŶt pooƌ health, 
there is Ŷo Ŷeed to pƌoteĐt the estate͛s fiŶaŶĐial iŶteƌests ǁhiĐh aƌe effeĐtiǀelǇ ŵiŶe,͟ 
para 28, c 68. 
 
Senior Judge Lush made his view very clear: 
 
͞The PuďliĐ GuaƌdiaŶ ďelieǀes the aŵouŶt of £ϭϭϳ,Ϯϴϵ is aŶ eǆĐessiǀe aŵouŶt to Đlaiŵ 
for out of pocket expenses. I would put it more strongly than that. I believe that 
ĐhaƌgiŶg oŶe͛s eldeƌlǇ ŵotheƌ a dailǇ ƌate of £ϰϬϬ foƌ ǀisitiŶg heƌ aŶd aĐtiŶg as heƌ 
attoƌŶeǇ is ƌepugŶaŶt͟ paƌa ϰϭ, Đ ϲϴ. 
 
Co-mingling of funds 
 
Failuƌe oŶ the paƌt of attoƌŶeǇs to keep the doŶoƌ͛s funds separate from their own is often 
found to be one of a wider set of misdeeds. C 41 (already cited) is a case in point where the 
main issue was the over-giftiŶg fƌoŵ the doŶoƌ͛s fuŶds to theŵselǀes – from funds that were 
held together with the attorney͛s oǁŶ fuŶds. Reasons for doing so vary. Attorneys may mix up 
donor funds with their own deliberately to draw a veil over what is going on. Alternatively, they 
may argue, perhaps disingenuously, that it is a result of incompetence or mismanagement:  
 
͞I kŶeǁ that ŵǇ duties as attoƌŶeǇ ƌeƋuiƌed ŵe to keep ŵǇ ŵotheƌ͛s fuŶds sepaƌate 
fƌoŵ ŵǇ oǁŶ. This ǁas the sole ƌeasoŶ I opeŶed the aĐĐouŶt…… I had opeŶed the 
aĐĐouŶt so that the aĐĐouŶt Ŷaŵe ƌead Mƌ BW [the attoƌŶeǇ͛s iŶitials] ƌe ;Ŷaŵe of 
property) and I believed that this was sufficient to fulfil my duties. The intention has 
alǁaǇs ďeeŶ that this ǁas ŵǇ ŵotheƌ͛s aĐĐouŶt aŶd that I ǁas siŵplǇ ŵaŶagiŶg it oŶ 
her behalf. I confess to not realising that I also ought to ensure the name was my 
ŵotheƌ͛s aŶd Ŷot ŵǇ own,͟ para 35, c 19. 
 
Senior Judge Lush gave this short shrift: 
 
  ͞I siŵplǇ doŶ͛t ďelieǀe it,͟ paƌa ϯϲ, Đ ϭϵ. 
 
In other cases, it appears that taking on the role of attorney is too much for some individuals 
ǁho theŶ Đlaiŵ ͚mistakes happen͛. In a case (c 27) where the Senior Judge decided to revoke 
an LPA, he did so on the basis of a list of failures: that one of two attorneys had mixed her own 
funds with those of the donor (her mother); had gone on to use her motheƌ͛s fuŶds foƌ heƌ 
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own benefit; had also allowed care home fees arrears to accumulate; had speŶt the doŶoƌ͛s 
money on herself, her husband and sons; and had failed to account to the PG. The attorney, a 
woman suffering severe physical health problems herself, claimed:  
 
͞As I haǀe said all aloŶg, I loǀe ŵǇ ŵuŵ aŶd ŵǇ faŵilǇ ǁith all ŵǇ heaƌt aŶd I͛ŵ 
heaƌtďƌokeŶ to thiŶk otheƌ people thiŶk otheƌǁise….. It͛s suĐh a shaŵe that ďad 
situations, a lack of good communication, and confusion has thrown everything up in 
the air and comes down iŶ a ŵess……. The last feǁ Ǉeaƌs haǀe ďeeŶ a Ŷightŵaƌe foƌ 
me, mentally and physically; what with losing my mum to this dreadful illness, trying 
ŵǇ ďest to get the help she Ŷeeded ….theŶ all this Court of Protection mental stress, 
and my physical pain getting ǁoƌse …. MǇ head is aďout to ďloǁ aŶd I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ hoǁ 
ŵuĐh ŵoƌe I aŵ eǆpeĐted to take….Please tƌust ŵe. I Đould Ŷot ďe ŵoƌe siŶĐeƌe aŶd 
honest about this if I tried. This has all been a case of grief, sadness confusion and mix 
ups͟ paƌas Ϯϭ/ϮϮ, Đ Ϯϳ. 
 
The Senior Judge pointed out that her son, a joint attorney with her, should have taken some 
ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ iŶ eŶsuƌiŶg his gƌaŶdŵotheƌ͛s affaiƌs ǁeƌe ŵaŶaged pƌopeƌlǇ. Both attoƌŶeǇs, he 
ĐoŶĐluded, had failed to aĐt iŶ the doŶoƌ͛s ďest iŶteƌests. 
 
Sometimes, though, there seems to have been wilful ignoring of their duties as attorneys to 
keep funds separate. In c 72, Senior Judge Lush stated that the respondent had failed in her 
fiduciary duty as attorney by continuing to pay herself an allowance for caring for her mother 
after her motheƌ͛s adŵissioŶ to a Đaƌe hoŵe. Moƌeoǀeƌ, she had failed to account satisfactorily 
foƌ the tƌaŶsaĐtioŶs she had Đaƌƌied out oŶ heƌ ŵotheƌ͛s ďehalf aŶd had: 
 
͞………ĐoŶtƌaǀeŶed heƌ dutǇ to keep heƌ ŵoŶeǇ sepaƌate fƌoŵ the doŶoƌ͛s. She had 
defiaŶtlǇ opeŶed aŶ aĐĐouŶt iŶ heƌ aŶd [heƌ ŵotheƌ] D͛s joiŶt Ŷaŵes sooŶ afteƌ heƌ 
ďƌotheƌ MaƌtǇŶ assuŵed oǀeƌall ĐoŶtƌol of the ŵaŶageŵeŶt of D͛s pƌopeƌtǇ aŶd 
fiŶaŶĐial affaiƌs͟ paƌa ϰϯ, Đ ϳϮ.  
 
Abusive behaviour 
 
Gifting to self and others 
 
Inappropriate gifting, or allegations of it, occurred in at least 10 cases. Discovery of such 
payments was often the result of investigations by OPG investigators after complaints had 
been made although in one case (c 6), inappropriate gifting was discovered almost accidentally. 
The local authority had taken an interest in the donor after being alerted by the police who 
had found her wandering at night.  OŶ the ĐouŶĐil͛s disĐoǀeƌǇ that £75,000 had passed to the 
family, the doŶoƌ͛s daughteƌ Đlaiŵed heƌ ŵotheƌ had had ĐapaĐitǇ at the tiŵe she had made 
the decision to gift it to them. Sceptical, the OPG on further investigation applied to the CoP 
for revocation of an LPA which had been registered.  Senior Judge Lush found as fact that the 
cheques totalling £75,000 had been signed by the daughter in her capacity as attorney. He 
stated that she, and another attorney, had contravened their authority as well as breaching 
their fiduciary duty in taking advantage of their position as attorneys.  
 
8 
 
In c ϯϬ, aŶotheƌ iŶstaŶĐe of attoƌŶeǇs ŵakiŶg gifts to theŵselǀes ͞faƌ iŶ eǆĐess of the liŵited 
authority conferred upon attorneys generally by section 12 of the MeŶtal CapaĐitǇ AĐt͟ ǁas 
presented. A witness statement by an OPG investigation officer described how both siblings 
ƌegaƌded theiƌ ŵotheƌ͛s assets as theiƌs:  
 
͞C“ ;the daughteƌͿ had ƌeĐeiǀed £ϮϮ,ϱϱϯ.ϯϭ aŶd PL ;the soŶͿ had ƌeĐeiǀed £ϭϵ,ϵϮϱ.ϲϯ 
fƌoŵ the aĐĐouŶt…. Both attoƌŶeǇs ƌegaƌd the ŵoŶeǇ iŶ theiƌ ŵotheƌ͛s aĐĐouŶt as their 
iŶheƌitaŶĐe aŶd ĐoŶsideƌ that theǇ aƌe eŶtitled to dip iŶto it duƌiŶg heƌ lifetiŵe,͟ paƌa 
16, c 30. 
 
In another case (c 41), unacceptable large-scale gifting was alleged to have taken place and the 
attorneys (two sisters) described as having ͞used their poweƌ ĐaƌelesslǇ aŶd iƌƌespoŶsiďlǇ͟ – 
ǁith the doŶoƌ͛s ŵaisoŶette house being sold foƌ £ϳϯϬ,ϬϬϬ, oŶe of the attoƌŶeǇ͛s ŵoƌtgage 
paid off and the property rented out, and £80,000 being spent on building works at another 
attoƌŶeǇ͛s oǁŶ pƌopeƌtǇ. Despite the sisters denying wrongdoing, Senior Judge Lush found that 
they had acted in contravention of their authority and had: 
 
͞compounded their culpability by taking colossal advantage of their position and 
obtaining personal benefits far in excess of the limited power that attorneys have to 
ŵake gifts of the doŶoƌ͛s pƌopeƌtǇ …. AŶd failed to keep the doŶoƌ͛s ŵoŶeǇ aŶd 
property interests separate from her own interest,͟ para 33 & 34, c 41. 
 
A third sibling, a brother, who had not been appointed as attorney with his 2 sisters, and who 
wanted to be appointed deputy in their place, did Ŷot esĐape the judge͛s ĐƌitiĐisŵ either: 
 
͞I seŶse that [ƌatheƌ thaŶ thiŶkiŶg of his ŵotheƌ͛s iŶteƌests] he is motivated partly by a 
desire to salvage his own inheritance and partly by a craving for revenge against his 
sisteƌ aŶd ďƌotheƌ,͟ paƌa ϯϴ, Đ ϰϭ. 
 
Incompetence 
 
The question of whether misbehaviour has taken place through incompetence is often at issue.  
This may result from ignorance (wilful or inadvertent) of the duties and authority conferred on 
attorneys on appointment, or from their general unsuitability. In c 70, for example, Senior 
Judge Lush pointed to the ignorance one of the attorneys had exhibited:  
 
͞AudƌeǇ had soŵe stƌaŶge ideas aďout the fuŶĐtioŶs aŶd duties of aŶ attoƌŶeǇ aĐtiŶg 
uŶdeƌ aŶ LPA. ….I asked AudƌeǇ a feǁ ďasiĐ ƋuestioŶs aďout the pƌiŶĐiples of the MeŶtal 
Capacity Act 2005, best interests decision-making and the fiduciary duties of an 
attoƌŶeǇ….. the answers to these questions required no more knowledge than the 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ that is alƌeadǇ ĐoŶtaiŶed iŶ iŶ Paƌt C of the LPA ǁhiĐh AudƌeǇ sigŶed ….. 
she didŶ͛t haǀe a Đlue …..…͟ paƌa ϯϴ/ϯϵ, Đ ϳϬ. 
 
But he went on to comment: 
 
͞ǁhat ĐoŶĐeƌŶs ŵe however is that Audrey has no intention or desire to learn about 
the pƌiŶĐiples ….. oƌ ďest iŶteƌests deĐisioŶ-making or her fiduciary duties as an 
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attorney. One of her personality traits is inflexibility or rigidity in thought and 
ďehaǀiouƌ. …..͟ paƌa ϰϬ, c 70. 
 
Ignorance of the nature of fiduciary duties was seen again in c 14, where the daughters of PL 
were objecting to the appointment of their brother as deputy for property and financial affairs: 
 
͞the stƌikiŶg featuƌe of this Đase ǁas that Ŷeitheƌ the applicant nor the respondents 
had any idea about the fiduciary duties and practical responsibilities that a deputy is 
expected to undertake and the roles of the Court of Protection and the Office of the 
Public Guardian in ensuring his ĐoŵpliaŶĐe,͟ paƌa Ϯϰ, c 1. 
 
 Reflections on cases 
 
The poisonous effect of intra-family dynamics  
 
Intra-family dynamics are often at the heart of much of the financial misbehaviour revealed in 
this analysis. Conflicting attitudes to family relationships and their associated expectations and 
obligations, between and within generations, involving caring responsibilities, mutual support 
and reciprocity, inheritance rights and expectations of honourable behaviour are all seen to 
play a part.  
 
From time to time, the proprietorial attitudes and assumed entitlements of some adult 
ĐhildƌeŶ toǁaƌds theiƌ paƌeŶts͛ assets ;͞their inheƌitaŶĐe͟) were revealed. In a case of possible 
large-scale gifting (to self and brothers), the OPG investigating officer alleged the attorney had 
said ͞if EG [heƌ ŵotheƌ] doesŶ͛t ŵiŶd aŶd she is ǁell-Đaƌed foƌ, ǁhat͛s the haƌŵ,͟ paƌa ϭϬ, c 6. 
In c 68 already noted above, the attorney͛s attitude to his ŵotheƌ aŶd heƌ estate was described 
by the Senior Judge as ͞Đallous aŶd ĐalĐulatiŶg͟ aŶd his ďehaǀiouƌ as ͞ƌepugŶaŶt.͟ 
  
While financial abuse was not alleged or found in every case where intra-family hostility was 
present – we identified 14 cases where both were present – there is no doubt that the 
existence of disputatious bad feeling meant that the appropriate exercise of attorney or deputy 
responsibilities was often compromised. Suspicions and jealousies, often to do with money, 
undermined good intentions and honourable behaviour. As one daughter said about her 
siblings:  
 
͞theǇ aƌe Ŷot the slightest ďit iŶteƌested oƌ ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith ŵǇ fatheƌ͛s ǁelfaƌe. TheǇ 
are interested in his money. They have already shown no inclination to agree that 
essential payments be made for his wellbeing and if they were made joint deputies, I 
fully expect they would stand in the way of such essential payment [in this case the 
installation of a shower and a stair-lift]͟, paƌa ϭϵ, Đ ϭϰ. 
 
Senior Judge Lush despaired of intra-family hostility of this sort saying that, in this case, none 
of the three sibling deputies had ͞any idea about the fiduciary duties and practical 
ƌespoŶsiďilities that a deputǇ is supposed to uŶdeƌtake,͟ and that ͞uŶfoƌtuŶatelǇ soŵe 
deputies take advantage of their position and family members are often the worst offendeƌs,͟ 
para 23, 31, c 14.  
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Disputes between siblings often centred on the failure of one or other of them to fulfil what 
they saw as their mutual obligations to love and care for their ageing parent. Sometimes a 
sibling would make these allegations only to be found to be wanting in exactly the same areas 
of failure.  In case 61, a daughter, Stephanie, claimed that her brother: 
 
͞……..ǁas ĐoŶtƌolliŶg ouƌ ŵuŵ͛s fiŶaŶĐes ǁithout legal authoƌitǇ. He has ŵade Ŷo 
money availaďle foƌ heƌ peƌsoŶal Ŷeeds.͟ para 15, c 61. 
 
But their sister responded saying: 
͞“oĐial seƌǀiĐes haǀe pƌoof of this. “tephaŶie has oŶlǇ ǀisited ŵǇ ŵotheƌ ϰ-6 times in 
fouƌ aŶd a half Ǉeaƌs. I doŶ͛t ďelieǀe “tephaŶie has ŵǇ ŵuŵ͛s ďest iŶteƌests at heaƌt,͟ 
para 19, c 61. 
 
The impact of public policy 
 
Assumptions about the right to inherit parental estates engender strong feelings within 
families and, in relation to this, public policy may exert a strong influence on the behaviour of 
some family members. Means-tested social care is one example. Families are sometimes  
teŵpted to aǀoid theiƌ depeŶdeŶt ƌelatiǀes͛ liaďilitǇ to paǇ foƌ soĐial Đaƌe ďǇ disposiŶg of theiƌ 
assets ;kŶoǁŶ as ͚depƌiǀatioŶ of assets͛Ϳ iŶ oƌder to conserve the estate (c 6, for example, 
involved a local council arguing that the faŵilǇ had kŶoǁiŶglǇ ƌuŶŶiŶg doǁŶ theiƌ paƌeŶt͛s 
assets). A second example is that of NHS Continuing Care, whereby, depending on the level 
and degree of non-hospital care required, the NHS may take on responsibility for its cost (c 55 
for example). The existence of arrears in payments to be made to care homes occurred in 
several cases, triggering, in turn, suspicions of wider financial misappropriation and 
misbehaviour. These poliĐǇ ͚tƌaps͛ ofteŶ Đolouƌ aŶd souƌ ƌelatioŶships ǁithiŶ faŵilies, 
sometimes leading to financial misbehaviour, and are frequently noted in public debate.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The ƌole of the faŵilǇ, aŶd soĐietǇ͛s ǀieǁ of it, is central to many of the cases coming before 
the CoP. The Court of Protection recognises that family members are most often the best 
people to act as attorneys and to be appointed as deputies (with close friends the next best 
alternative).7 But at the same time, the CoP also recognises, through direct experience drawn 
from individual cases, that family behaviour can sometimes be imperfect.   
 
At best, family members will assume responsibility for the property and financial affairs of a 
relative, often a parent, impeccably. At worst, taking up the responsibility has one or other of 
two negative impacts – either it poisons pre-existing intra-family relationships further, or it 
                                                          
7 ͞The CoP has ……traditioŶally preferred to appoiŶt a relatiǀe or frieŶd as deputy …. rather thaŶ a Đoŵplete straŶger out of 
respeĐt for their relatioŶship ……Ŷoǁ refleĐted iŶ ArtiĐle ϴ of the EuropeaŶ CoŶǀeŶtioŶ oŶ HuŵaŶ Rights ďut there are other 
more practical reasons for choosing a family member.  
A relatiǀe ǁill ďe faŵiliar ǁith P’s affairs aŶd aǁare of their ǁishes aŶd feeliŶgs. “oŵeoŶe ǁith a Đlose persoŶal kŶoǁledge 
of P is also likely to be in a better position to meet the obligation of a deputy to consult with P and to permit and encourage 
theŵ to partiĐipate ….. as fully as possiďle iŶ aŶy aĐt or deĐisioŶ affeĐtiŶg theŵ,͟ paras 3ϳ & 3ϴ , Đ 5ϴ. 
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precipitates bad feeling where none existed in the past.  Several cases showed families fighting 
openly amongst each other following a pattern established years previously while in other 
cases, hostility had broken out only after the issue of attorneyships had taken centre stage. 
 
To conclude, analysis of the cases reveals the complexity of family life and shows how 
conventional expectations of good behaviour may often go unrealised, to the detriment of the 
individual at the centre of the case (the donor). In the light of behaviour and attitudes revealed 
to the Court, commonly-held assumptions aďout the ͚faŵilǇ͛ – of goodwill, mutual support, 
͚blood being thicker than water͛ – often prove to be unfounded. This suggests that vulnerable 
people who lack capacity – together with their assets – are often at greater risk from their 
relatives than is generally assumed.  
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